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Abstract 
In 1998, Colombia entered a severe recession. GDP contracted by 4.2% in 1999, and the 
unemployment rate surpassed 20%. Political turmoil exacerbated trade and fiscal 
imbalances. The economic downturn led to credit contractions, particularly in the 
mortgage market. The nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio increased from 8% in December 
1997 to 16.1% in November 1999. The NPL ratio for residential mortgages grew from 6% 
in December 1997 to 19.8% in January 2000. 
In 1999, due to the continuous deterioration of credit institutions, the government, through 
FOGAFIN (the Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund—the state agency for bank 
resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence 
and solvency in the financial system. The government implemented a three-year economic 
recovery program that, among other measures, included capitalization of credit 
institutions. This authority was given through Resolution 006 of 1999, in which FOGAFIN 
granted loans to the shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to recapitalize their 
institutions. Resolution 006 of 2001 gave the authority to further capitalize credit 
institutions specialized in mortgage lending. 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset capital injections programs.   
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. 




At a Glance  
In the late 1990s, Colombia’s 
economy weakened. Political turmoil 
exacerbated trade and fiscal 
imbalances. The Asian and Russian 
financial crises contributed to the 
deterioration in market confidence. 
The economic downturn led to credit 
contractions, particularly in the 
mortgage market. In 1998, Colombia 
entered a severe recession (IMF 
2001). In 1999, GDP contracted by 
4.2%, while the unemployment rate 
surpassed 20% (FOGAFIN 2009). The 
nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio 
increased from 8% in December 1997 
to 16.1% in November 1999. The NPL 
ratio for residential mortgages grew 
from 6% in December 1997 to 19.8% 
in January 2000 (IMF 2001). 
In November 1998, Colombia 
declared a “Social and Economic State 
of Emergency” through Decree 2330, 
followed with the announcement of 
the first set of measures in support of 
the financial sector through Decree 
2331 that included support 
mechanisms for mortgage debtors 
from institutions facing liquidation 
(Decree 2330 1998; Decree 2331 
1998). 
In 1999, due to the continuous 
deterioration of credit institutions, 
the government, through FOGAFIN 
(the Financial Institutions Guarantee 
Fund—the state agency for bank 
 
4 Exchange rate in June 1999 was Colombian pesos (COP) 1,693 = $1 (FRED 2021). 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: The government capitalization was a line of 
credit provided to the shareholders of credit institutions 
to exclusively strengthen their capitalization ratios. 
Announcement Date June 30, 1999 (first line) 
August 10, 2001 (second line) 
End of Issuance Window December 31, 1999, last day to 
apply (first line) 
July 31, 2002, last day to apply 
(second line) 
Legal Authority Resolution 006 of 1999 (first) 
Resolution 006 of 
2001(second) 
Program Size Unspecified 
Total Utilization COP 1.09 trillion4  
COP 492.8 billion in 1999 
COP 599.9 billion in 2001 
Participants  14 financial institutions: 10 in 
1999 and four (specialized in 
mortgage lending) in 2001 
Administrator FOGAFIN (Financial 
Institutions Guarantee Fund) 
Notable Features Institutions had to write off 
NPLs before the capitalization 
process. Then, FOGAFIN 
granted loans to institutions to 
be used exclusively for 
capitalization. 
The 2001 resolution was 
specifically targeted for 
institutions specialized in 
mortgage lending. 
Colombia: FOGAFIN Capitalizations of  
1999 and 2001 
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resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence 
and solvency in the financial system. It aimed to avoid systemic risk, control moral hazard, 
minimize direct government administration in the financial sector, and reduce fiscal costs 
(FOGAFIN 2009). The Colombian government launched a three-year economic recovery 
program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) that 
included capitalization of credit institutions, resolution and restructuring measures for 
unviable banks and other financial institutions, and other various rescue measures related 
to debtor law and housing reform (FOGAFIN 2001; IMF 2001; Morrison 2000). In June 
1999, to provide capitalization for both public and private credit institutions, the 
Colombian government passed Resolution 006 of 1999.  
In regard to public banks, to preserve financial stability, strengthen their equity, recover 
their viability, reduce fiscal costs of cleaning up, and minimize government participation in 
the financial sector, the government decided to privatize all public banks with the 
exception of Banco Agrario, which remained the only public bank, given its importance to 
provide financing to small and medium-sized farmers in the country (FOGAFIN 2009). 
The capitalization process for public banks was composed of five stages: clean-up, capital 
strengthening, disposal of NPLs, administrative restructuring, and sale of the institution 
(FOGAFIN 2000). For private banks, the capitalization process was composed of three 
stages: clean-up, capital strengthening, and signing of a performance agreement (FOGAFIN 
2000). 
A total of 10 institutions were capitalized through Resolution 006 of 1999 for a total of COP 
652,821 million, of which COP 492,788 million were FOGAFIN loans and COP 160,033 
million were contributions by shareholders (FOGAGIN 2009; see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Use of Capitalization Line of 1999 (Millions of Colombian Pesos—COP) 
















Colpatria Aug/1999 38,110 174,001 212,111 57,454 269,565 21.3% 
Banco 
Superior 
Jul/1999 8,806 85,047 93,853 25,041 118,894 21.1% 
Banco de 
Credito 
Dec/1999 — 59,965 59,965 14,992 74,957 20% 
Interbanco Oct/1999 1,016 42,181 43,197 15,441 58,638 26.3% 
Banco Union Jul/1999 1,803 25,525 27,328 5,371 32,699 16.4% 
Corfinorte Dec/1999 — 19,752 19,752 27,942 47,694 58.6% 
Coltefinancie
ra 
Oct/1999 9,104 19,348 28,452 11,254 39,706 28.3% 
Multifinanci
era 
Nov/1999 — 2,863 2,863 1,939 4,802 40.4% 
Credinver Feb/2000 88 2,050 2,138 599 2,737 21.9% 
Confinancier
a 
Nov/2000 — 3,129 3,129 — 3,129 0% 
Total  58,927 433,861 492,788 160,033 652,821 24.5% 
Note: Banco Selfin and Banco Findesarrollo requested access to the line. However, their 
shareholders did not capitalize their corresponding portion, and the banks therefore were 
liquidated. 
Sources: FOGAFIN 2000; FOGAFIN 2009. 
Four out of the five private banks specialized in mortgage lending received capitalization 
through Resolution 006 of 2001. These were Colpatria, AV Villas, Colmena, and Conavi. The 
other bank, Davivienda, did not request access. The total capitalization amounted to 
COP 716 billion, of which COP 599.9 billion were FOGAFIN loans granted and COP 116 
billion were contributions by shareholders, 16.2% of the total capitalization (FOGAFIN 
2009; see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Use of Capitalization Line of 2001 (Billions of Colombian Pesos—COP) 













Colpatria — 40 25 65 35 100 35% 
AV Villas 52 156 52 260 — 260 0% 
Colmena — 120 — 120 30 150 20% 
Conavi — 113.7 41.2 154.9 51 206 24.8% 
Total 52 429.7 118.2 599.9 116 716 16.2% 
*BOCAS were bonds optionally convertible into shares. 
Source: FOGAFIN 2009. 
Overall, FOGAFIN granted loans through both capitalization lines of 1999 and 2001 for 
COP 1.09 trillion to 13 credit institutions. Colpatria was the only institution to access both. 
Shareholders contributed COP 276 billion (20.2% of the total capitalization). The total 
amount of capitalizations was COP 1.37 trillion (FOGAFIN 2009; see Figures 1–3). 


















Resolution 006 of 
1999 
10 492,788 160,033 652,821 24.5% 
Resolution 006 of 
2001 




276,122 1,368,821 20.2% 
*Colpatria was the only institution to access both capitalization lines. 
Source: FOGAFIN 2009. 
By 2008, the government recovered COP 1.7 trillion from the payment of capital and 
interest on the FOGAFIN loans granted to shareholders of private institutions. Thanks to 
the financial recovery, they were able to pay in advance. Of the 13 institutions capitalized, 
all except Interbanco paid their obligations to FOGAFIN in full, and before the agreed term. 
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All paid in cash, with the exception of Multifinanciera, which delivered assets as a payment 
to FOGAFIN. Two institutions— Interbanco and Corfinorte—were intervened and 
liquidated, and two others—Credinver and Multifinanciera—were voluntarily dismantled. 
All the other institutions recovered and continued in operation (FOGAFIN 2009). 
Summary Evaluation 
By 2001, Colombian economic indicators of solvency, profitability, portfolio quality, and 
portfolio coverage showed positive trends in the banking system (Heenan et al. 2007). The 
average capital adequacy ratio improved from 11.2% in December 1999 to 13.8% in 
December 2000, and the average NPL ratio declined from 13.5% to 11.1%. However, it is 
hard to identify how much improvement can be attributed to the capitalizations as 
Colombian macroeconomic conditions improved (IMF 2001). The capitalizations of 1999 
and 2001 did not represent any cost to the government, owing to the good financial 
performance of the institutions that accessed them.  
Given that the Colombian government underwent various reforms simultaneously, there 
are few evaluations of the capitalization process. For instance, in terms of capital injections 
to private banks, the IMF evaluated that “[w]hile this scheme was generally successful in 
improving the capital adequacy ratios of the institutions that were supported, it does 
subject FOGAFIN to losses should the banks fail but not to the gains that would accrue if the 
banks’ fully recover.” The IMF also implied that capital adequacy ratios were improved as a 
result of the combination of write-offs of impaired assets prior to the capital injection and 
the capitalization (IMF 2001).  
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Colombia Context 1998-1999 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$98.4 billion in 1998 
$86.2 billion in 1999 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$2,566 in 1998 
$2,210 in 1999 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt) 
 











Size of banking system 
 
Data not available for 1998 
Data not available for 1999 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
34.2% in 1998 
32.6% in 1999 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
96.3% in1998 
93.7% in 1999 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
 
76.9% in 1998 
83.8% in 1999 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
6% in 1998 
22% in 1999 
Government ownership of banking system 
37% in 1998 
18% in 1999 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 1998 
Yes in 1999 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: In 1999, the Colombian government initiated rescue policies 
to restore confidence in the financial system and implemented a three-year 
economic recovery program including capitalization lines for credit institutions, 
resolution and restructuring measures for unviable banks and other financial 
institutions, as well as other various rescue measures related to debtor law and 
housing reform. 
In 1999, due to the continuous deterioration of credit institutions, the government, through 
FOGAFIN (the Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund—the state agency for bank 
resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence 
and solvency in the financial system. It aimed to avoid systemic risk, control moral hazard, 
minimize direct government administration in the financial sector, and reduce fiscal costs 
(Botero Garrido 2006). The Colombian government launched a three-year economic 
recovery program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) 
that included capitalization lines for credit institutions, resolution and restructuring 
measures for unviable banks and other financial institutions, as well as other various 
rescue measures related to debtor law and housing reform (FOGAFIN 2001; IMF 2001; 
Morrison 2000). 
In June 1999, to provide capitalization for both public and private credit institutions, the 
Colombian government passed Resolution 006 of 1999. Two years later, Resolution 006 of 
2001 gave the authority to further capitalize credit institutions specialized in mortgage 
lending (Resolution 006 1999; Resolution 006 2001). The capitalization process for public 
banks was composed of five stages: clean-up, capital strengthening, disposal of 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), administrative restructuring, and sale of the institution. For 
private banks, the capitalization process was composed of three stages: clean-up, capital 
strengthening, and signing of a performance agreement (FOGAFIN 2000). 
2. Legal Authority: Resolution 006 of 1999 provided the authority for the 
capitalization of credit institutions. This was later expanded in 1999 through 
Resolution 011 of 1999, and furthermore in 2001 with another capitalization 
line through Resolution 006 of 2001.  
On November 16, 1998, Colombia declared a “Social and Economic State of Emergency” 
through Decree 2330, followed the same day with the announcement of the first set of 
measures in support of the financial sector through Decree 2331 that included support 
mechanisms for mortgage debtors from institutions facing liquidation (Decree 2330 1998; 
Decree 2331 1998). 
In June 1999, Resolution 006 of 1999 gave the authority for capitalizations of credit 
institutions through FOGAFIN. Resolution 011 of 1999 allowed for institutions that 
received a first FOGAFIN loan to receive a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). In 
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August 2001, Colombia passed Resolution 006 of 2001 that gave the authority for 
capitalizations of credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending (Resolution 006 1999, 
Resolution 006 2001). 
3. Administration/Governance: FOGAFIN, with the assistance of the Banking 
Superintendency, was in charge of the capitalization process of credit 
institutions. 
FOGAFIN was created in 1985 to deal with a previous financial crisis in the 1980s and help 
with capitalization efforts of the financial system. For the Colombian crisis that started in 
the late 1990s, FOGAFIN executed the government’s rescue plan, focused on the banking 
system (FOGAFIN 2021). 
4. Size: There was no announced limit on the total size of the recapitalizations 
announced in 1999 and 2001.  
There was no announced limit on the total size of the recapitalizations announced in 1999 
and 2001. Overall, FOGAFIN granted loans through both capitalization lines of 1999 and 
2001 for COP 1.09 trillion to 13 credit institutions. Colpatria was the only institution to 
access both. Shareholders contributed COP 276 billion (20.2% of the total capitalization). 
The total amount of capitalizations was COP 1.37 trillion (FOGAFIN 2009; see Figures 1–3). 
A total of 10 institutions were capitalized through Resolution 006 of 1999 for a total of 
COP 652,821 million, of which COP 492,788 million were FOGAFIN loans and 
COP 160,033 million were contributions by shareholders (FOGAGIN 2009; see Figure 1). Of 
the five private banks specialized in mortgage lending, four accessed the capitalization 
through Resolution 006 of 2001. These were Colpatria, AV Villas, Colmena, and Conavi. The 
other bank, Davivienda, did not request access. The total capitalization amounted to 
COP 716 billion, of which COP 599.9 billion were FOGAFIN loans granted and COP 116 
billion were contributions by shareholders, 16.2% of the total capitalization (FOGAFIN 
2009; see Figure 2). 
5. Funding Source: Funding for capitalization of credit institutions came from the 
issuance of FOGAFIN bonds and the collections of the tax on financial 
transactions established in 1998. 
The funding for the capitalization of public banks came from the issuance of FOGAFIN 
bonds and the collections of the tax on financial transactions established in 1998. Initially, 
FOGAFIN issued COP 3 trillion in bonds to cover the costs of the capitalization of public 
banks. However, due to higher than expected costs by more than COP 1.2 billion, a second 
issuance of FOGAFIN bonds was performed (FOGAFIN 2000). 
The capitalization process for private banks was financed through the issuance of FOGAFIN 
bonds (backed by the Deposit Insurance Reserve) subscribed by the institutions being 
capitalized. The service of the bonds was covered with the recovery of the FOGAFIN loan 
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granted to shareholders, so that it did not generate a fiscal cost to the government. 
FOGAFIN charged additional percentage points to the DTF5 rate, to cover the cost of 
potential default, in which case, FOGAFIN enforced the guarantees provided by the 
institution (Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 1999; Resolution 006 2001). 
6. Eligible Institutions: All credit institutions, both public and private, were eligible 
in 1999, and later in 2001, only credit institutions specialized in mortgage 
lending were eligible.  
Both public and private credit institutions were eligible for the capitalization process under 
Resolution 006 of 1999 announced in June 1999. Credit institutions had until December 31, 
1999 (about six months) to apply for access (Resolution 006 1999). This line was extended 
through Resolution 011 of 1999 to allow institutions that received a first FOGAFIN loan to 
apply for a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). For the 2001 capitalization line 
launched to support credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending, eligible institutions 
included those that had at least 50% of their portfolios in mortgage loans as of December 
31, 2000. They had until July 31, 2002 to apply (Resolution 006 2001). 
In regard to public banks, to preserve financial stability, strengthen their equity, recover 
their viability, reduce fiscal costs of cleaning up, and minimize government participation in 
the financial sector, the government decided to privatize all public banks with the 
exception of Banco Agrario, which remained the only public bank, given its importance to 
provide financing to small and medium-sized farmers in the country (FOGAFIN 2009). 
As part of the process and a pre-requisite for capitalization, credit institutions were 
required to write off their nonperforming loans in such a way that it reasonably reflected 
their true economic value (Resolution 006 1999). If, after the provision and amortization of 
the NPLs, the credit institution’s technical equity dropped below zero (0), its shareholders 
had to capitalize the institution with their own resources to bring its technical equity to at 
least zero (0). 
7. Individual Participation Limits: The capitalization was set to restore a solvency 
margin of 9% for public banks and 10% in the case of private banks. 
For public banks, to perform the second stage of capital strengthening, FOGAFIN 
capitalized institutions until reaching a solvency margin of 9%. For private credit 
institutions, to perform the second stage of capital strengthening, institutions were 
capitalized to restore a solvency margin of 10%. For this purpose, FOGAFIN granted loans 
to shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to capitalize their institutions. 
FOGAFIN provided long-term loans for up to 90% of the amount necessary, but the long-
term loans could not exceed 80% of the total capitalization. To ensure a long-term loan, 
shareholders had to grant shares of the institution as collateral at a minimum value of 
 
5 The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest rates on 90-day 
certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006). 
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133% of the loan, according to the valuation carried out by the international financial 
advisors (FOGAFIN 2000; FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5). 
Resolution 011 of 1999 allowed for institutions that received a first FOGAFIN loan to apply 
for a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). The resolution also stipulated that 
FOGAFIN could grant loans to shareholders for up to 100% of the resources required by 
the institution. An operation with Confinanciera’s shareholders was the only one carried 
out under the new conditions (FOGAFIN 2009). 
Under Resolution 006 of 2001, the difference was that the amount of capitalization 
required was determined by the adjustments ordered by the Banking Superintendency, 
while in the 1999 regulation, it was the result of a reorganization process that was 
specified in the resolution (FOGAFIN 2009). Under the 2001 regulation, FOGAFIN could 
invest in bonds optionally convertible into shares (BOCAS) up to 80% of the resources 
required by the institution so that its solvency ratio reached 10%. In this case, the 
investment was made once the shareholders had capitalized their institution, at least in an 
amount equivalent to the difference between the capital necessary to achieve a 10% 
solvency ratio and the value of the investment (Resolution 006 2001). 
Shareholders and credit institutions that requested access could do so one or more times, 
as long as they complied with the provisions of the resolution and the total amount of the 
operations did not exceed 80% of the global value of the adjustments required by the 
Banking Superintendency (Resolution 006 2001). 
8. Capital Characteristics: FOGAFIN granted four types of assistance to capitalize 
credit institutions: public bank capitalizations, bridge loans to shareholders, 
loans to capitalize private banks, and loans to capitalize credit institutions 
specialized in mortgage lending. 
FOGAFIN granted four types of capitalization assistance: (a) public bank capitalizations, (b) 
bridge loans to shareholders, (b) loans for private bank capitalizations, and (d) loans for 
credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending. 
(a) Public bank capitalizations  
After the write-off of nonperforming assets, to perform the second stage of capital 
strengthening, FOGAFIN issued bonds or invested proceeds from the financial transactions 
tax to capitalize the institution until reaching a solvency margin of 9% (FOGAFIN 2000). 
In the third stage, nonperforming assets were transferred to Central de Inversiones S.A. 
(CISA). In September 2000, FOGAFIN acquired a CISA, a public special purpose vehicle for 
the management and disposal of bad assets (FOGAFIN 2001; Heenan et al. 2007; Resolution 
006 1999; also see the YPFS case study on CISA, Engbith and León Hoyos 2021). 
In the fourth stage, institutions went through administrative restructuring in preparation 
for their sale. The main objectives were to reduce administrative and personnel costs, 
avoid the deterioration of the institutions’ assets, and reduce the upward pressure exerted 
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by public institutions on the market deposit rates. The restructuring was carried out with 
the assistance of specialized external consultants. In the fifth and final stage, the 
institutions were sold. FOGAFIN hired investment banking firms to privatize the healthy 
banks (FOGAFIN 2000). 
(b) Bridge loans to shareholders: 
In the first stage of clean-up, institutions had to write off their NPLs in a way that 
reasonably reflected their true economic value. If, after the write-offs, the institution’s 
technical equity was negative, its shareholders had to capitalize the institution with their 
own resources to bring its technical equity to at least zero (0). Shareholders had to 
contribute, with their own resources, at least 20% of the amount necessary to strengthen 
the technical equity of the institution (FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999). 
In 1999, it was in many cases unfeasible for shareholders to capitalize immediately. To 
facilitate the disbursement of resources corresponding to shareholders, FOGAFIN granted 
shareholders a six-month bridge loan that allowed financing 50% of this capitalization, and 
the Banking Superintendency extended the term to 12 months for the remaining 50%. 
Figure 4: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Bridge Loans under Resolution 006 
of 1999 
 Bridge Loans FOGAFIN Bonds 
Term Up to 6 months 270 days 
Interest rate DTF* + 2% DTF 
Amortization At maturity At maturity 
Interest payment Semiannual Semiannual 
Guarantees 
133% of the FOGAFIN 
loan 
FOGAFIN 
*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of 
interest rates on 90-day certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian 
banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006). 
Source: Resolution 006 1999. 
(c) Loans for private bank capitalizations: 
In the second stage of capital strengthening, it was necessary to capitalize the institution to 
restore a solvency margin of 10%. For this purpose, FOGAFIN granted loans to 
shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to capitalize their institutions. FOGAFIN 
provided long-term loans for up to 90% of the amount necessary, but the long-term loans 
could not exceed 80% of the total capitalization. To ensure a long-term loan, shareholders 
had to grant shares of the institution as collateral at a minimum value of 133% of the loan, 
according to the valuation carried out by the international financial advisors (FOGAFIN 
2000; FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5). FOGAFIN disbursed the loans 
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directly to the participating institution receiving the capitalization, to its account at the 
central bank. Once the payment was posted, the institution recorded the new level of 
capitalization and immediately invested an equal amount in bonds that FOGAFIN issued for 
the capitalization (Resolution 006 1999; see Figures 4–7). 
Figure 5: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Loans under Resolution 006 of 1999 
 Loans to Shareholders FOGAFIN Bonds 
Term 3 to 7 years; expanded to 9 
years 
7 years (average) 
Grace period for interest 1 year; expanded to 2.5 years None 
Grace period for capital 3 years; expanded to 4 years N/A 
Interest rate DTF* + 2% (first 3 years) 
DTF + 3% (last 4 years) 
DTF 
Amortization Biannual At maturity 
Interest payment Quarterly or semiannual Quarterly 
Guarantees 133% of the FOGAFIN loan FOGAFIN 
*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest 
rates on 90-day certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and 
financial institutions (Rowland 2006). 
Sources: Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 1999. 
In any case, shareholders had to sign an adjustment plan with the Banking 
Superintendency to guarantee with solid and sufficient sources of payment (letters of 
credit from a first-level foreign bank or resources coming from the execution of irrevocable 
commercial trust contracts that had as their objective the sale of assets, for commercial 
value of at least 133% of the loan) (FOGAFIN 2000; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5). 
Additionally, FOGAFIN established mechanisms to ensure that at least 78% of the political 
rights of the total outstanding shares of the institution were immediately transferred to 
FOGAFIN, in case of default. Notwithstanding, FOGAFIN’s Board of Directors could 
authorize guarantees other than those indicated. 
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Figure 6: General Mechanism of Capitalization Line under Resolution 006 of 1999 
 
Source: FOGAFIN 2009, 120. 
(d) Loans to credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending: 
In 2001, Colombia passed Resolution 006 of 2001, which allowed for capitalizations of 
credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending (Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 
2001). FOGAFIN granted loans to shareholders of credit institutions and/or the 
subscription by FOGAFIN of bonds optionally convertible into shares issued by the 
institutions (FOGAFIN 2009). Institutions could issue BOCAS, as long as such bonds 
strengthened the equity of the institution, stated the irrevocable condition of being 
subordinated debt, and met the following requirements: 
i. That the portfolio purchased by the shareholders corresponded exclusively to a 
portfolio rated C, D, or E or to a written-off portfolio, registered as of December 
31, 2000; 
ii. That the purchase value of the portfolio C, D, or E in no case was less than the net 
value plus provisions of said portfolio, including interest and other items 
associated with it; 
iii. That the purchase value of the written-off portfolio was in no case less than the 
value recorded in memorandum accounts, including interest and other items 
associated with it; and 
iv. That the respective credit institution did not enter into repurchase agreements 
on the portfolio referred, directly or indirectly, during the validity of the loans 
(FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 2001). 
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Figure 7: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Loans under Resolution 006 of 2001 
 Long-Term Short-Term BOCAS* FOGAFIN Bonds 
Term Up to 9 years Up to 1 year Up to 9 years Up to 10 years 
Amount Up to 80% of the 
adjustment 
determined by the 
Superintendency to 
reach a solvency 
ratio of 10% 





to reach a 
solvency ratio of 
10% 
  
Grace period Up to 2.5 years for 
interest and 4 years 
for capital 
N/A Up to 2.5 years for 
interest and 4 years 
for capital 
 
Interest rate DTF* + 3% DTF + 2% DTF + 3% DTF + 1% 
Capitalization up 
to the first 5 
semesters 
Amortization Biannual At expiration Biannual At expiration 
Interest 
payment 
Biannual At expiration Biannual At expiration 
Guarantees 133% of the value 
of the loan in shares 
pledged 
133% of the 
value of the loan 
in shares 
pledged 
133% of the value 
of the loan in shares 
pledged 
 
*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest rates on 90-day 
certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006). 
*BOCAS were bonds optionally convertible into shares. 
Sources: Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 2001. 
(1) Fate of Existing Board and Management: There is no information on whether the 
existing board and management at the participating banks were removed or 
replaced. 
 Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision. 
(2) Allocation of Losses for Existing Stakeholders: Prior to capitalizations, NPLs were 
written off and shareholders had to capitalize their institution to bring its technical 
equity to at least zero. 
For private institutions, in the first stage of clean-up, institutions had to write off their NPLs 
in a way that reasonably reflected their true economic value. If, after the write-offs, the 
institution’s technical equity was negative, its shareholders had to capitalize the institution 
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with their own resources to bring its technical equity to at least zero (0). Shareholders had 
to contribute, with their own resources, at least 20% of the amount necessary to 
strengthen the technical equity of the institution (FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999). 
It was agreed with the shareholders that all of the distributable dividends should be used 
to pay remaining balances of the loans granted by FOGAFIN to the institution (Botero 
Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 of 2001). 
9. Exit Strategy: There does not seem to have been a solid exit strategy. 
Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision. 
10. Changes in Relevant Regulation: There do not seem to have been any relevant 
changes in the regulation. 
Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision. 
11. Debt Restructuring Plan: As part of the capitalization process, private credit 
institutions had to sign a performance agreement. 
As part of the capitalization process of private credit institutions, in the third and final 
stage, institutions signed a performance agreement that included the goals that they had to 
meet to guarantee their solvency and the payment of the long-term loan. These goals were 
defined by FOGAFIN, the financial institution, and the Banking Superintendency, with the 
support of international consultants. Additionally, in each capitalized institution, an 
internal control office was installed to ensure compliance with the signed agreements, 
without actually comanaging the institution (FOGAFIN 2000). The control office reported 
the results of its management to FOGAFIN, and its operating costs were borne by the 
institution being capitalized. 
Institutions capitalized had to authorize FOGAFIN and external consultants hired by 
suggestion of FOGAFIN to determine and quantify the assets that should be provisioned to 
determine the economic value of their shares (Resolution 006 1999). 
In the fourth stage of the capitalization of public banks, institutions went through 
administrative restructuring in preparation for their sale. The main objectives were to 
reduce administrative and personnel costs, avoid the deterioration of the institutions’ 
assets, and reduce the upward pressure exerted by public institutions on the market 
deposit rates. The restructuring was carried out with the assistance of specialized external 
consultants (FOGAFIN 2000, 10). In the fifth and final stage, the institutions were sold. 
FOGAFIN hired investment banking firms to privatize the healthy banks (FOGAFIN 2000). 
12. Other Conditions: Institutions capitalized agreed to authorize FOGAFIN and 
external consultants to set the economic value of the shares that maintained the 
value of the guarantees. 
Institutions had to authorize FOGAFIN, and external consultants hired under the 
responsibility of the institution capitalized, to establish the economic value of the shares of 
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the institution and any other requirement that FOGAFIN deemed necessary. Institutions 
had to contract with consultants the periodic reviews of the economic value of the shares to 
maintain the value of the guarantees. The costs generated by hiring external consultants or 
any other concept associated with the operations was fully assumed by the institution or 
shareholders. Credit institutions had to authorize the statutory auditor and the internal 
auditor to provide the information required at any time by FOGAFIN. The cost arising from 
these requests was to be covered by the respective institution (Resolution 006 2001). 
For Resolution 006 of 2001, when the request for loans corresponded to shareholders of an 
institution capitalized under Resolution 006 of 1999, FOGAFIN, with approval of its board 
of directors, could authorize that some of the conditions initially granted be modified, 
based on the adjustments or precautionary measures arranged or ordered by the Banking 
Superintendency to the institution (Resolution 006 2001). 
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